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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE NATIONAL ARMY ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATION O THE "DRA e.-
In Aryer v. U. S., and five similar cases attacking the validity of the so-
called National Army Act of May 18, 1917, Public Statutes, No. 12, 65th
Congress, c. -, - Stat. -. ) the Supreme Court unanimously sustained 
the
validity of the Act so far as attacked. The contention that compulsory mil-
itary service as provided in the Act is contrary to our fundamental concep-
tion of the nature of citizenship, and that such compulsion is repugnant to
a free government and in conflict with the guaranties of the Constitution
as to individual liberty, the Court disposed of summarily and completely
by pointing out that the power given to Congress to raise armies was plenary,
subject to no limitations and co-extensive with the same powers possessed
by other governments. This part of the argument runs largely upon his-
torical grounds. As the Court says, the arguments of the objectors are
clearly untenable. The contention that even though Congress possesses the
power to raise armies, its members cannot be sent out of the United States
without their consent is due, as the court points out, to the wholly inexcus-
able confusion between limitations upon the power of Congress over the
organized State militia and the power of Congress over such armies as it
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may raise under Art. i, § 8, of the Constitution. The oojections raised were
obviously flimsy if not wholly insincere and were based upon no sound legal
grounds. For this reason, and as the gist of the Court's opinion has been
made widely known extended comment here is undesirable. The opinion
of the Court with its marginal notes contains important historical references
showing that the principle of the Act in question is quite in accord with our
own colonial and national experience and policies and with that of other
great nations of the world.
On the same day in the case of Jones v. Perkins, No. 738, the Court
affirmed the decision in the similar case in 243 Fed. Rep. 997, in which a
writ of habeas corpus, asked for on the ground of the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of the Act, was refused, the court merely referring to its reasoning
and decision in the Arver case as disposing of the contention.
On June 14th the Court handed down three other opinions touching the
same act of Congress-that which attracted the greatest public attention, at
the time of the occurrence involved, being the case of Emma Goldman and
Alexander Berkman v. U. S., No. 702, 38 Sup. Ct. 166. The Court reduces
the numerous contentions of plaintiffs in error to three, of which the first
is based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the Selective Draft Law.
Again the Court referred to the Arver case as disposing of this attack. The
indictment in the Goldman & Berkman Case was under sections of the
U. S. Criminal Code and charged the unlawful conspiring together and with
others to induce persons who were under duty to register in accordance
with the Selective Draft Law to disobey said law by failing to register. The
second of the contentions is that as the conspiracy was not successful, no.
crime was committed. But inasmuch as the indictment charged not only
the conspiring but also the doing of overt acts in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, this was in and of itself essentially and substantively a crime, pun-
ishable as such without regard to the success or failure of the criminal act.
This had been established in previous decisions. U. S. v. Rabinowich, 238
U. S. 78; U. S. v. Holte, 236 U. S. 14o; Joplin Mercantile Co. v. U. S., 236
U. S. 534. The third contention of plaintiffs in error was comprised of
varied assertions that the evidence did not tend to show guilt, a contention
which involved inexcusable effort to induce the Supreme Court to invade the
province of the jury by passing upon the questions of the credibility and the
weight of evidence.
Kramer v. U. S., No. 68o, 38 Sup. Ct. 168, was disposed of by decisions
in the Arver and Goldman Cases. In Ruthenberg, Wagenknecht and Baker
v. U. S.. No. 656, 38 Sup. Ct. 168, in addition to points disposed of in the
Arver Case the plaintiffs in error urged two objections, both of which they
should have known and probably did know had been adversely disposed of
by the Supreme Court in numerous earlier cases, They asserted that they
were Socialists and claimed that the grand and trial jurors were made up
exclusively of men of other political parties and of property owners. Pre-
cisely the same point in principle had been raised in numerous cases by
negro defendants who had been tried by juries composed exclusively of
white men. Such a trial had been pronounced constitutional as long ago as
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1879. Va. v. Rives, IOO U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 and in a long line of cases
including Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278. The other objections were even
more devoid of merit and need not be noticed here.
The validity of certain methods for administering the Selective Draft
Law as provided for therein was brought into question in three cases in
District Courts of the U. S. In Ex Parte Hutflis, 245 Fed. Rep. 798, the
District Court for the Western District of N. Y. sustained by implication
the provision for the creation of Legal and District Boards to determine all
questions of exemption and all claims for excluding or discharging individ-
uals or classes from the draft. The relator, who was unable to read or write
English, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to release him from the
custody of the military authorities on the ground that though he was an
alien, through ignorance he had failed to file his claim for exemption within
the time limited, and that on learning the requirements of the law, after he
had beefn accepted for the army, he applied to a Local Board for a form
upon which to file his claim for exemption, but by mistake was given the
wrong blank. It resulted from these facts that the petitioner had no hearing,
that his exemption was not passed upon and that as a result he was subject
to military authority though exempted by the terms of the Act and, as he
claimed, by treaty rights in accordance with the treaty between the United
States and Austria-Hungary. The court disposed of the treaty claim by
saying that the Selective Draft Law impliedly exempts aliens who are merely
denizens of the United States and, moreover, that the Draft Law makes no
provision for exemption because of treaty rights. Unquestionably this is
sound. A later act of Congress controls or prevails. Taylor v. Morton,
2 Curt. C. C. 454, Fed. Cas. No. 13,799; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580;
Rainey v. U. S. 232 U. S. 31o, 58 L. Ed. 617. The court then made what ap-
pears to be an equitable disposition of the case by refusing to make the
writ absolute at the time, retaining jurisdiction for ten days to allow an ap-
plication to the Adjutant General for permission to reopen the case before
the Local Board.
In United States ex rel Troiana v. Heyburn, Sheriff, 245 Fed. Rep. 360,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pa. refused to issue the writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of relators who are aliens, who sought by such
writ in effect to secure a review by the Court of the proceedings of the
Local Board which had passed upon their claims for exemption. This Court
too sustained the validity of the Selective Draft Law in providing for the
Local Board and held that-the courts would not review the proceedings of
such tribunals except upon a showing of lack of jurisdiction, usurpation of
power or arbitrary denial of rights. The court here was upon thoroughly
established ground. The principle that administrative tribunals may be
given finality of decision and that the courts will not review their proceed-
ings except in the cases mentioned is too well established to require much
citation. See, however, U. S. v. J Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 49 L. Ed. io4o;
Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters 524; Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. io6;
Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 48 L. Ed. 525; and article by T. R.
Powwra,, i Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583.
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In Ex. Parte Blackingtoll, 245 Fed. Rep. 8oi, a somewhat shocking case
was presented. Relator had enlisted in the National Guard and was after-
ward drafted into the Federal Service. His petition claims that he was
below the required height and had other serious physical disqualifications.
He was favorably passed upon for the National Guard Service by a medical
officer who was prejudiced against him and who had declared that he 
would
"get even" with petitioner for some prior occurrence. Petitioner knew of
these facts at the time he volunteered and made no objection; but after 
he
was drafted into the National Army he consulted other physicians 
who ad-
vised him that he could not safely perform' military duty. Meantime 
he had
been examined and passed upon favorably by the Federal medical officers
for the National Service and though he endeavored persistently to be dis-
charged therefrom, he failed. The Court dismissed the petition and remand-
ed the petitioner to the military authorities, largely upon the ground that the
enlistment was voluntary, that neither the party enlisting nor the military au-
thorities occupied a fiduciary relationship with each other, and that the pur-
pose of the examination is not to give to the applicant assurances that 
he
is physically fit for military service, but only to prevent undesirable men
from getting into the army. U. S. v. Cottinglam, i Rob. (20 Va.) 
615.
Perhaps this decision was sound. Perhaps there were facts as brought 
out
upon the petition and hearing in open court which tended to convince 
the
Court that petitioner was endeavoring to shirk. But upon the allegations
of the petition as reported by the Court it would seem that here was 
a
case calling for a re-examination, if the law and rules permitted it.
The objections urged against the Draft Law and its administration in
all the cases here noted, except the last one, are obviously trivial or worse.
An examination of the names of the score or more contestants would cause
one to suspect that in some cases at least their obstructing efforts were part
of that treacherous hostile propaganda, with which we now know our coun-
try has been menacingly infiltrated, both before and since the beginning 
of
the War. The patriotic and clear-visioned pronouncement of our courts
in these cases is a cause for sincere appreciation and congratulation.H. M. B.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. L. Rev.  379 1917-1918
